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War, in its various forms - domestic, international, mixed, with different aims such as 
self-defense, autonomy, religion, ethnic identity or political beliefs, despite the 
expectations and efforts of the previous generations, still represents a “common 
manner” for states and political, ethnic and religious groups to solve disputes. Within 
such a context, individuals, in their citizen-posture, have the continuous duty to reflect 
upon the morality of the current or future wars fought on their behalf. The XXIst 
Introduction  
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century places this discussion in a special geo-political context. 9/11, the al Qaeda 
attacks and the multiple global events generated by these, led to major changes of the 
character of armed violence and, at the same time, of their moral implications. All of 
these changes reopen the way of conventions and practices of the moral norms of war. 
The Just War Theory (JWT) is without question the central theory in the 
contemporary debate regarding war and the moral implications of the new forms of 
military violence. 
Concerning the contemporary changes the just war theory has to address, these are 
represented by the accelerated pace of globalization and the economic and 
informational interconnectivity of states. Globalization influences the parties 
exercising armed violence, the organization and use of armed forces and also the 
available weapons. All of these changes are part of, or are consolidated by 
globalization, since globalization represents the scene, where they perform within 
different instances, these being, in fact, the new challenges of the just war theory.  
Such instances are represented by the decline of state-sovereignty, of the principle of 
exclusive state authority concerning the national interest and of non-interference of 
foreign states within the national territory; by the proliferation of the international 
human rights movements generating global practical standards for the relationship 
between states and their citizens; by the emergence of international non-state 
terrorism and by the diffusion of destructive military arms such as weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). All of these led to transformations for the use of armed force 
and, thus, they represent challenges for the contemporary just war theory.  
 
Just and Unjust Wars - The Modern Just War Theory 
 3 
The contemporary just war theory is best illustrated by Michael Walzer in Just and 
Unjust Wars and comprises two elements: the legalist paradigm and the war 
convention, the modern versions of the classical ius ad bellum and ius in bello. 
Walzer conceives the ius ad bellum – legalist paradigm in a limited manner within 
which the core position of the crime of war is occupied by aggression1
Thus, the legalist paradigm focuses exclusively on aggression and therefore, the right 
to war is articulated in terms of resistance against it: “nothing but aggression can 
justify war” [62]. This central focus of the legalist paradigm is also reflected by the 
international law that stipulates the unique right to war of the states as self-defense – 
as formulated in Article 2, line 4 and Article 51 of the UNO Charter, although there 
are some stipulations regarding the multilateral use of force when the Security 
Council recognizes a threat to the international peace and security – Chapter VII of 
the UNO Charter.   
. The author 
defines aggression as an act of intrusion that endangers the rights and autonomy of 
political communities through the threat or use of force and thus, the states have the 
right to defend themselves against aggression using force under two limited 
conditions [62]: 1) a state can respond to aggression using force in order to defend the 
domestic subject of aggression such as the victim-state and its people; and 2), at a 
more general level, states have the right to withstand aggression viewed as an insult to 
the fundamental values of the international society. Under this condition, the 
resistance has two forms – a self-defensive war of the victim and a war of 
enforcement fought by the victim state or by any other member of the international 
community.  
The two elements of Michael Walzer’s theory present the XXth century just war 
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doctrine as a projection of the two world wars and of the bipolar global order imposed 
by the Cold War. Self-defense against aggression, as the single just cause for war, can 
be, thus, interpreted as a responsible maneuver for the clausewitzian fear that modern 
war tends towards extreme positions, nuclear war in our case.  
 
The Just War Theory of the XXth century, as described by Walzer, undergoes a 
process of changes and challenges along with the events determined by the end of the 
Cold War. The most shaped form of this process is represented by the enlargement of 
the classical category of ius ad bellum in order to comprise the humanitarian war or 
intervention. This evolution of the theory, basically, overturns the main role of 
defense against aggression as the sole right cause for war. This period is defined by 
the New American Interventionism of the Clinton Administration and Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace and is marked by numerous cases of 
humanitarian interventions – North of Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, East Timor and 
Kosovo
JWT and the End of the Cold War  
2. The release of Boutros-Ghali’s Report is synonymous with the increased 
role of the UNO’s military-humanitarian policies and shapes the new military doctrine 
of peace keeping. At the same time, the end of the Cold War unmasks the 
phenomenon of failed states, ethnic conflict and brutal civil wars that were held under 
control by the bipolar order of the Cold War, and, under this new reality, the need for 
humanitarian war is more stringent than ever. Nonetheless, the 9/11 events, the 
Afghanistan War and Iraq War marked a period of great “uncertainty and 
disequilibrium”3. This moment reveals a resurrection of existent beliefs, conventions 
and practices of the public discourse regarding the values and actions of political 
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communities. It is unarguable the moment when the just war theory will occupy the 
central position within this discourse offering the common moral language to all the 
participant parties. The right to war of the states, in certain circumstances, is, thus, 
reargued and, together with it, the ius ad bellum category is reexamined in view of 
identifying the best formula to preserve, split or modify it, in order to answer the new 
security environment. In Just Wars Against Terror: The Burden of American Power, 
Jean Bethke Elshtain compares the impact that 9/11 had on the international system 
with the shock of the medieval world determined by the fall of Rome in 4104
 
. Both 
events, the author argues, shook the moral foundations of their time and led to 
“decades of anxiety and instability”. These moments are relevant for our discussion 
since they both marked the resurrection of the good and evil rhetoric – always an 
indicator of the moral disturbance.   
From the perspective of the evolution of the just war theory the humanitarian 
intervention can be divided in three historical phases
Humanitarian intervention – as means of change for the JWT    
5: The first is temporally 
demarcated by the writings of St. Augustine and the Early Middle Ages; this period is 
dominated by the political and ethical thought of the Christian world in which the 
political leaders have the universal duty to watch justice. Within such a context, on 
the shoulders of the secular rulers lays the responsibility to enforce the law within the 
Christian space and the divine duty to protect the innocent6. Sovereignty does not 
limit the actions and does not restrict the physical boundaries for the duties of the 
leaders because their justice is not geographically limited since the divine natural law, 
on one hand, represents the common element of Christianity and, on the other hand, 
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the majority of the political entities are not entirely sovereign.  
A second phase is demarcated by the end of the Middle Ages up to 1945 and has, as a 
core element, the idea that there exists a right, but not a duty, to war in order to 
protect the innocent. Thus, the main preoccupation of the theorists is represented by 
the idea of constraining the right to interfere, phenomenon determined on the 
background of two major conceptual changes: the separation of rights and duties and 
the transition from a Christian common space to the idea of distinct political 
communities7. Francisco de Vitoria is among the theorists who argue for the 
limitation of the right for intervention, suggesting the transition from duty to the 
permission to intervene and he establishes restrictions concerning the circumstances 
and the length of the actions admitted by this norm. Although the author shares the 
idea of a universal community, governed by natural law, still, within the discussion 
dedicated to the American Indies, he claims the limitation of the humanitarian war, 
placing the responsibility to protect the population against the crimes of tyranny and 
oppression within the jurisdiction of the princes8
On the other hand, Grotius claims that the sovereigns hold a right to intervene, but not 
a duty to help other states’ people. The right to intervene is placed by Grotius in a 
restrictive context determined by the problems of abuse and humanitarian war 
pretexts signaled by Vitoria. Moreover, Grotius insists on the responsibility to obey 
the law and outlaws any form of rebellion, even against a tyrannical system.  
. The just causes for the humanitarian 
war that Vitoria prescribes are cannibalism and human sacrifice, but still these 
categories are dominated by restrictions in the sense that war has to end as soon as the 
crimes are eliminated, and natural law, as the spring for humanitarian war, cannot 
represent a pretext for empire aggrandizement or other hidden interests.   
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Pufendorf  argues that the sovereigns don’t have the right to intervene in view of 
eliminating the natural law abuses and they can only help third parties, but this 
following their express request for assistance9. Yet, for Wolff nothing can justify the 
right to intervention, thus entirely prohibiting the “punitive” war. The elimination of 
humanitarian interventions both as right and duty of the states, is later explained by 
John Stuart Mill through the so-called test of self-determination: the free form of 
governments cannot be legitimately set up without a domestic struggle for freedom10
Emerich de Vattel sustains the general principle of non-intervention considering that 
each state has its right to govern according to its own norms, right from which the 
prerogative for punishing the crimes that threaten its security follows. Yet, de Vattel 
shares the exception articulated by Pufendorf in terms of the permission to intervene 
in isolated cases, represented by tyrannical regimes that can lead to legitimate 
rebellions and under the conditions of the express call of the rebels for assistance.  
. 
Mill shares Kant’s view that non-intervention represents an essential condition for a 
free government although he reserves this right to the civilized people and places the 
barbarians as legitimate subjects for foreign domination.  
Thus, we can see that each of the authors mentioned above choose either the total ban 
of intervention, or a limited form of it. The reticence for humanitarian/punitive war 
can also be explained by the context of the conflicts of the XVIIth century and by the 
will to avoid their reoccurrence. Still, in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries the 
European states continued to often justify the use of force in humanitarian terms.  
1945 marks the beginning of a new phase of the humanitarian intervention – the 
express ban of every use of armed force except self-defense. The new law order 
outlaws the use of military violence and establishes a mechanism for the authorization 
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of humanitarian intervention - the Security Council - with the role to authorize 
collective enforcement actions every time a threat to international peace and order is 
identified. Still, the Security Council didn’t work according to these established 
norms and the cases of the violations of human rights in Biafra, Cambodia, Latin 
America, Zaire, Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Afghanistan and East Timor etc. led to 
significant casualties.  
During the Cold War states maintained their reluctance regarding humanitarian 
intervention and the international community refused constantly to legitimate this 
type of actions. In the most severe cases USA together with their allies opted for 
economic sanctions such as those applied to Vietnam for the invasion of Cambodia in 
1978. Although the 1990’ registered a progress concerning the receptivity towards 
this kind of intervention, yet the Security Council failed to promptly answer the 
humanitarian emergences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Darfur.  
At the same time, the 9/11 attack, but especially the events determined by it, reopen 
the discussion concerning the anticipatory war and the moral dimension implied by 
the anticipatory use of force. The anticipatory spectrum is defined by two extremes: 
the reflex act – the preemptive war and the preventive war defined as an attack against 
a distant danger, subject of precaution and rational voice. Thus, under the just war 
theory the preemptive war – seen as a reflex action – is admitted unlike preventive 
war, which crosses the boundaries of legitimate use of force.  
Under these restrictions, the USA invasion in Afghanistan (2001), although not a 
preemptive one benefits from the international community support and thus we can 
consider an extension of the ius ad bellum classical category in relation with the 
principle of self-defense that justified the invasion. At the same time, we have to 
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underline that under the ius in bello criteria, the invasion reveals the negative attitude 
towards the treatment applied by the USA to the war prisoners in Afghanistan. Both 
France and Great Britain opposed the US decision that the detainees were not war 
prisoners and thus could not benefit from the protection of the Geneva Conventions’ 
stipulations and they threatened not to deliver the detainees to the USA. The 
international pressure led in the end to the policy change on behalf of the American 
party, fact that determines us to observe that, unlike the principles of ius ad bellum, 
those of the ius in bello are not subject of any compromise in view of modifying the 
classical structure of the just war theory.  
Moreover, the Afghanistan War determines at least two international novelties: the 
first is the Resolution 1360 of the Security Council – an action without precedent in 
its history in which terrorism is declared a threat against the international peace and 
security, thus offering the states the possibility to invoke the right to self-defense and 
legitimizing the unilateral use of force as an answer to terrorist acts; and the second is 
the attribution of the responsibility for the terrorist attacks to a state – Afghanistan – 
although these were the acts of non-state actors placed within the territory of this 
state.  
The Iraq War (2003) represents another case where the enlargement of the classical 
ius ad bellum is desired as seen from the perspective of the anticipatory self-defense 
invoked by the National Security Strategy of the USA. Yet, this attempt is 
counteracted by a part of the international community, including the main NATO 
allies, France and Germany, that do not support the USA position. The evident 
connection between the Taliban regime and al Qaeda represented, in the case of 
Afghanistan, a real threat not only for the USA but also for the security of the whole 
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international community. In this context, the international acceptance for enlarging 
the principles of ius ad bellum is manifested and the Operation Enduring Freedom is 
not labeled as a violation of international law. In the case of Iraq, the evidence 
brought by the USA and Great Britain for the claim of the connection between Iraq, 
weapons of mass destruction and al Qaeda are ambiguous and, in some cases, false. 
Without adequate proof, ignoring the anticipatory self-defense principle is thus 
abusive even in the case of the world’s single superpower.  
 
Within an international environment characterized by the fact that the means of 
containment specific to the Cold War don’t function anymore, the most important 
issue is represented by the answer to the question – is the change of just war theory 
and, implicitly, of the international law in view of comprising the preventive self-
defense principle possible? The answer is an affirmative one. International law is not 
a rigid set of norms and its history proves its adaptability to the changes the 
international society goes through in time. Even the stipulations of the UNO’s Charter 
indicate this adaptability – the Afghanistan invasion being a proof in this sense. 
Concerning the just war theory, the supreme proof of its adaptability is embedded in 
its current existence – the theory could not have survived until the XXIst century if it 
did not adapt to an international system constantly subjected by changes, and the fact 
that the theory is partially absorbed by the international law warrants its future 
existence. Still, we need to underline the fact that although these two institutions can 
support changes, this is not synonymous with changes under just any condition.  
Conclusion  
 11 
 
                                                 
1  Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2006).  
2  United Nations Organization, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, http://www.un.org/docs/ SG/agpeace.html 
(accessed 25.05.2012). 
3  Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 224.  
4 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power 
(New York: Basic Books, 2004), 151.  
5 Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars From Cicero to Iraq, (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 
203-7.  
6 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Just War and Humanitarian Intervention,” Ideas: From 
the National Humanities Centre 8 (2001): 1-21, 7-8.  
7 Bellamy, Just Wars, 203.  
8 Anthony Pagden, Jeremy Lawrance, Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 231-92.  
9  Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 1729, 
http://archive.org/details/oflawofnaturenat00pufe (accessed 17.03.2012). 
 
10 John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention”, Foreign Policy 
Perspectives 8, http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/forep/forep008.pdf (accessed 
27.05.2012): 6. 
 
 12 
                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
